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I. INTRODUCTION
When asked to provide commentary on another scholar's
reflections on Grutterl and Gratz2 and affirmative action, I am
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., UCLA,
1983; J.D., Yale University, 1986. I want to express my gratitude to both Professor
Dorothy Brown and the Houston Law Review for inviting me to provide a responsive
commentary to Professor Brown's Frankel Lecture.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316-17, 321, 325 (2003) (upholding the
University of Michigan Law School's ("Michigan Law School's") policy that allowed race to
be considered a "plus" factor for admissions against an equal protection challenge).
2. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (finding the University of
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usually struck by two fears. First, because so much ink has been
spilled on this topic, I worry the main presenter will have
nothing new and interesting to say. Today this worry has been
put to rest; I am so pleased that Professor Dorothy Brown offers
a number of novel and intriguing observations and, in the end,
advances a novel and intriguing proposal about the role Critical
Race Theory ought to play in our nation's law school classrooms.
Second, for the same reason, I worry that I will have nothing new
and interesting to say. Whether that is the case today I will leave
in your capable hands to judge.
Rather than rehash the debate over diversity in admissions,
Professor Brown usefully addresses here what I will call "second-
generation issues." Once a law school attains a modicum of racial
diversity, through whatever "first-generation" race-based
admissions process it deems necessary and appropriate, what
then can, or should, or indeed must it do in terms of "second-
generation" academic programming to ensure that the full value
of diversity in the classroom is being realized?
I agree with Professor Brown that this second-generation
question is critically important. There is a meaningful distinction
between simply creating a diverse community and actually
getting the community to function so as to achieve the goals of
diversity. I agree that law schools should provide an environment
in which students learn how to approach legal problems, as well
as life itself, from multiple perspectives or viewpoints.
Indeed in some ways, as I shall explain, the questions posed
by a second-generation focus are perhaps more vexing than the
first-generation admissions decision, in part because they require
even greater specificity of the goals of a diverse educational
environment. I shall use these remarks to begin thinking aloud
about these issues, in the context of responding to Professor
Brown's interesting propositions and proposals. In my comments
today I will focus primarily on her most ambitious and novel
proposal: that law schools with race-based admissions policies
are obligated to infuse the curriculum expressly with discourse
about racial issues.3 In particular, Professor Brown urges law
schools to use the insights of Critical Race Theory as a lens
through which to teach courses ranging from Admiralty to Wills.4
Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts' point-based admissions policy
unconstitutional based on a failure to create narrowly-tailored means).
3. Dorothy A. Brown, Address, Taking Grutter Seriously: Getting Beyond the
Numbers, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) ("Law schools at the very least must ensure that
race based discussions are incorporated into their classrooms.").
4. Id. at 32-35.
[43:1
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In my view, this proposal presents some constitutional risks to
affirmative action programs, and I wonder whether it is a good
idea.
II. THE NEED TO ADDRESS SECOND-GENERATION ISSUES
Professor Brown claims that the constitutionality of race-
based admissions policies might well turn on the successful
adoption of post-admission programs designed to turn what she
calls "structural diversity," by which she means integrated
classrooms, into "classroom" and "informational interactional
diversity," by which she means classrooms in which stereotyped
thinking is challenged and students are exposed to and develop
understandings about racial and ethnic issues.' She asks whether
law schools that use race in admissions but do not require
curricula that specifically promote "'cross-racial understanding'
are "walking targets."6 And she quotes from Justice Scalia's
dissent in Grutter suggesting that law schools with race-based
admissions policies can claim to be advancing a compelling state
interest only if they "walk the walk" with integrative post-
admissions programming: "[Tiempting targets" for future legal
challenges "will be those universities that talk the talk of
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the
walk of tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses-
through minority-only student organizations, separate minority
housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even
separate minority-only graduation ceremonies."7
I personally believe it is silly to conclude from the fact that
racial segregation persists in campus cafeterias and residence
halls that universities aren't all that serious about breaking
down racial divisions once students are admitted. It is entirely
natural for all students to seek some spaces where they can
congregate with fellow travelers with whom they feel some social
affinity. Athletes often choose to eat and live and hang out with
5. This argument was more clearly made in the version of the paper Professor
Brown presented at the Frankel Lecture itself, in response to which this Commentary was
crafted. In this updated version of the paper, she presents the question rhetorically: "If all
a law school does is admit a racially diverse class, without ensuring that any cross-racial
dialogue is taking place inside the classroom, will that be sufficient to prevail against the
next [constitutional] challenge?" Id. at 4. Professor Brown then observes, "It is here that
Dean Caminker and I part company," evidencing her continuing belief that "be[ing]
concerned about what happens to the student body once they matriculate.. . is ... a legal
requirement under Grutter." Id. at 4 n. 14.
6. Id. at 29.
7. Id. at 6 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
2006]
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other athletes. Thespians and artists do the same. And marching
band geeks do too-I know, as I was one of them myself, though
admittedly I was a drummer and I mostly hung out with other
drummers because we thought we were cooler than the rest.
Which, I know, isn't saying much. But the point is that members
of many groups, not just minorities, choose to hang out
together-even though this may not be as visible to Justice
Scalia and others walking across college campuses because
unlike race, one cannot easily "see" groupings of athletes or
actors sitting together; their common trait is not visible to the
casual observer.
And the fact that minorities or athletes or southerners or
preppies often hang out together in social spaces does not
undermine the fact that, in the classroom, as well as many
extracurricular settings, members of these groups do inevitably
interact with others of diverse backgrounds and experiences. One
doesn't have to be in a diverse group every minute of the day in
order to gain from it.
But more importantly, neither the majority nor concurring
opinions ever suggested in Grutter that any post-admission
programming efforts were a precondition for the validity of
admissions-related diversity efforts.8 For example, the Court did
not inquire, or suggest the district court should have inquired,
into the nature and success of classroom conversations, the
content of course syllabi, or any other aspects of the educational
curriculum.9 Rather, as I read Grutter, the Court held that the
goal of "structural diversity," again meaning simply the modest
racial integration of the student body, is itself a sufficiently
essential component of a high-quality educational environment
so as to constitute a compelling state interest.'°
And this determination is not surprising, because a great
deal of social science and anecdotal data supports the notion that
putting a diverse group of people together in a collaborative
environment of sustained interaction will tend to break down
stereotypes and generate feelings of tolerance and respect.1' I
8. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29 (emphasizing Michigan Law School's right to select
students, deferring to the institution's judgment that diversity itself will accrue benefits,
and making no reference to any post-admission requirements).
9. Id. at 317-21 (summarizing the district court's holding as invalidating Michigan
Law School's admissions policy based on admissions criteria, and making no reference to
post-admissions criteria).
10. Id. at 329, 333 (finding Michigan Law School's interest in obtaining a diverse
student body compelling and agreeing that "a 'critical mass' of underrepresented
minorities is necessary to further [this] compelling interest").
11. See, e.g., id. at 330.
[43:1
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have seen this myself over the past fifteen years of teaching in
diverse classrooms, both at UCLA and Michigan law schools, and
I have heard many other professors express the same
experiences.
Moreover, I think the majority opinion accepted diversity in
admissions as a permissible goal in part because society has
come to accept the same goal in many other institutions. The
Court was clearly moved by the argument of the military and
Fortune 500 companies that diversity in membership served
compelling interests. 2 And surely the Court is aware that many
other actors tout the value of diversity-including our current
President when he selects Supreme Court Justices and cabinet
members. But in none of these other contexts has anyone
seriously suggested that race-conscious hiring decisions are
unconstitutional absent good-faith second-generation efforts to
make sure that racial issues are then discussed in the workplace
or considered in judicial or cabinet-level decisions. Our legal and
social culture has come to accept the legitimacy and importance
of diversity in many different contexts without demanding
further efforts to maximize its effects.
For these reasons and more, I disagree with Professor
Brown's suggestion that teaching Critical Race Theory
throughout the law school curriculum, or adopting any other
post-admissions curricular reform, is constitutionally required for
any university with an affirmative action admissions program.
Diversification of the student body is an important enough goal
in and of itself, given the inevitable ways in which a critical mass
of minority students will lead all students to confront and
embrace alternative perspectives and viewpoints.
But this legal conclusion does not make Professor Brown's
focus on second-generation issues of educational equality
irrelevant or unimportant. To the contrary, I believe these issues
are quite critical to our educational missions-even though they
present issues of public policy or political morality rather than
legal compulsion under the compelling state interest standard. In
other words, while as a matter of equal protection doctrine
diversity in admissions is itself "walking the walk," we do our
12. Id. at 330-31 ("These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people .... What
is more, high-ranking retired officers.., of the United States military assert that... a
'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Brief
for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))).
2006]
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students a disservice unless we also consider whether specific
curricular or extracurricular programs can constitutionally and
productively build on the benefits of our admissions program.
III. RATIONALES BEHIND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Several different rationales have been advanced for
affirmative action in admissions. The three primary rationales
are remedial, integrative, and diversity. The remedial rationale
is backward-looking, arguing that affirmative action is necessary
to redress prior discrimination against minorities in admission
decisions. 3 The integrative rationale is forward-looking, arguing
that affirmative action is necessary to break down societal
barriers and allow for integrated leadership in various
professional and social walks of life in future society.4 The
diversity rationale is focused on the present, arguing that racial
diversity in the classroom enhances the quality of education
provided.1'
For the most part, these rationales have been advanced in
public policy debates and in litigation as alternatives that justify
roughly the same policy: taking race into account in admissions
decisions as necessary to enroll more than a token number of
underrepresented minorities. 6  When it comes to program
specifics, however, each of the three rationales might plausibly be
thought to justify a different model, or range of models, of
admissions policies. Grutter reaffirms that an affirmative action
program must be narrowly tailored to achieve the interest that is
defined as compelling.17 A number of important program
variables, such as how many individuals, from which minority
13. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-09 (1978) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion) (finding that only in response to specific cases of disparate treatment
does "[tihe State certainly [have] a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of [such] identified discrimination").
14. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2002) (defining the integrative rationale "as a forward-
looking remedy for segregation" that "dismantl[es] current barriers" by "proactively
us[ing] race-conscious means to undo the continuing causes of unjust race-based
disadvantage").
15. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (relying on Michigan Law School's determination
that diversity is a necessary component of a quality education).
16. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 14, at 1197-99 (presenting competing
justifications for affirmative action--compensatory and integrative-as different ways to
rationalize affirmative action).
17. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 ("Even in the limited circumstance when drawing racial
distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state interest, government is still
'constrained in how it may pursue that end: [TIhe means chosen to accomplish the
[government's] asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish
that purpose.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996))).
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groups, and how long ought they benefit from special
consideration, must necessarily be determined by reference to the
compelling goal supposedly being served. So far, the affirmative
action debate has focused primarily on whether any special
consideration is appropriate. And because ever since Bakke1" the
Court has seemed open only to the diversity rationale in the
context of higher education, little judicial attention has been paid
to how each of these three rationales might translate differently
into specific admissions programs.
Grutter might be understood as opening the door to greater
consideration of the integrative rationale than had previously
been assumed. After a long discussion devoted to the proposition
that diversity in the classroom enhances the learning experience
for budding lawyers in several respects,19 Justice O'Connor
spends several paragraphs discussing the ways in which an
integrated student body at an elite institution, such as the
University of Michigan Law School ("Michigan Law School"), can
lead to important forms of societal integration down the road.2 °
First, she observes that law schools (especially elite ones) have
traditionally produced a meaningful number of leaders of the
legal profession or government, including judges and elected
policymakers. 1 In the undergraduate context, elite colleges and
universities (including the service academies) provide training
for important leadership positions in the military.22 Racial
diversity in elite schools will enhance, over time, racial diversity
in these and other leadership positions. Second, in a more
general sense, access to higher education puts students in a
better position to engage more fully in civic society after
graduation.23  Finally, affirmative action can enhance the
legitimacy of leadership whatever its ultimate composition, by
18. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10 (qualifying affirmative action as a remedial
measure).
19. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-30 (accepting that "diversity... yield[s]
educational benefits" and finding that "[tlhese benefits are substantial").
20. See id. at 330 (finding that "[tihe Law School's claim of a compelling interest is
further bolstered by ... evidence... that student body diversity.. .'better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals.'" (quoting Brief for Am. Educ. Research Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))).
21. Id. at 332.
22. See id. at 331 (emphasizing that colleges and universities with ROTC programs
are one of"t]he primary sources for the Nation's officer corps").
23. See id. at 331-32 (recognizing that "education [plays] ... a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of society" because it can facilitate "[e]ffective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation").
20061
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ensuring that the "path to leadership" through higher education
remains "visibly open."24
Without a doubt, though, the bulk of Grutter's analysis
focuses on the present-time educational benefits secured through
a racially diverse student body.25 And the remedial rationale
finds no expression at all in Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court. At the moment, then, the diversity rationale is the
dominant justification for race-conscious admissions policies
within the realm of judicial doctrine.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RATIONALES AND SECOND-GENERATION
ARGUMENTS
For this reason, it seems to me that any serious conversation
about second-generation issues, again meaning curricular or
extracurricular programming to enhance the benefits of diversity
in law schools, must start with the assumption that improving
the educational experience is the primary compelling interest
driving the analysis, perhaps as supplemented by the integration
goal.
Therefore, I will comment only briefly on a couple of the
proposals Professor Brown advances. Although these proposals
might be sensible as a matter of policy, they seem more directly
tailored to goals other than enhancing the educational benefits of
diversity. I'll then spend more time reflecting on Professor
Brown's novel proposal to promote these educational benefits of
diversity by infusing the law school curriculum with insights
from Critical Race Theory.
A. Full Participation in Law School
First, Professor Brown proposes that, beyond being admitted
in appropriate numbers to law school, students of color should
"be involved in every part of the law school's activities" and
"must become student bar presidents and editors in chief of law
reviews. " The idea here is that "law schools are not performing
right"27 unless minority students are fairly represented in
24. Id. at 332.
25. See id. at 328-33 (finding sufficient evidence that student body diversity
enhances the learning experience among all students and deferring to "[t]he Law School's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission").
26. Brown, supra note 3, at 30.
27. Id. at 23.
[43:1
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leadership positions within the student body; "[hiaving students
of color present but without a voice will not solve the problem."
28
It's not clear to me just how law schools themselves can or
should ensure that minority students have greater
representation among the student body leadership positions. If
Professor Brown has in mind some race-conscious selection
criteria or race-conscious boost to minority candidates for such
positions, then the question arises whether the program is
narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. I can easily
understand how the goal of promoting minority leadership within
law school communities and activities flows from the integrative
rationale for diversity. If the point of integration is to produce
minority lawyers who will assume important leadership roles in
society, then perhaps it makes sense to give minority students
experience at handling leadership roles during law school,
essentially as a training ground for the professional life to come.
This also provides some answer to Justice Scalia's challenge that
minority-only political or social groups on campus reflect a
betrayal of diversity principles. 9 Rather, minority-only groups
provide opportunities and space for minority students to embrace
leadership roles, whereas many of these students might not find
such roles in integrated student groupings. More tenuously, I
suppose one could argue that placing more students of color in
leadership positions furthers the remedial rationale for race-
based admissions, on the assumption that many of these
students would have been better situated to compete for such
leadership positions but for prior illegal racial discrimination. °
But it isn't clear to me how having more minority student
leaders in extracurricular or social activities flows from Grutter's
primary rationale of promoting the educational benefits of
diversity. Student government, law review, and similar
leadership roles function outside of the classroom. Of course,
students talk about the law and legal issues all the time in these
groups, so diversity within the groups will positively influence
the educational value of the conversation. But if minority
students were not involved in and spending time with these
groups, they'd likely be spending time in other groups. So it is
28. Id. at 30.
29. See supra text accompanying note 7.
30. Perhaps this is what Professor Brown has in mind when she suggests that
"[liaw schools will not have lived up to the debt they owe their students of color who are
providing structural diversity until they are as likely to be a member of law review or
order of the coif as they are to be the president of the student bar association." Brown,
supra note 3, at 22 (emphasis added). The only "debt" I can imagine being owed as a
moral matter is an obligation to compensate for prior illegal discrimination.
2006]
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unclear if there is a net gain to be had, rather than just a
reallocation of conversational benefits, from diversifying
leadership groups as opposed to other groups. Specifically with
reference to law reviews, Professor Brown endorses Professor
Paul Finkelman's view that increasing the number of black
students on law review will increase the number of student notes
written about issues concerning racial inequality.8  Even
assuming this is true, it's not clear that increasing such student
notes will even indirectly improve "cross-racial understanding" in
the classroom or achieve any of the other pedagogic benefits that
motivate the diversity rationale for race-conscious admissions.
B. Improving Minority Academic Performance
Professor Brown also endorses several suggestions for
improving the "academic performance of [law] students of color."'
She, following Rick Sander,33 does an important service by
focusing our attention on the underappreciated reality that
minority students tend to cluster in the bottom half of the class.34
Without question this is a problem deserving of serious study and
a meaningful response-whether through a race-based
educational program such as special tutoring for minority
students, through race-based hiring to diversify the faculty, as
Professor Brown proposes,35 or through some other (plausibly
race-neutral) means.
How these efforts to enhance minority performance flow
from a commitment to race-conscious admissions decisions,
however, is not so clear. I suppose one could plausibly ground
this initiative in the integration rationale, based on the premise
that if more minority students perform well academically during
law school, then more minority graduates are likely to be offered
either initial or mid-career employment opportunities in
leadership positions. And I suppose one could plausibly ground
this initiative in the remedial rationale, to the extent that the
31. Id. at 23 & n.99 (citing Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges'Robes Were Black:
African-American Lawyers as Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 166 (1994)).
32. See id. at 4, 27 (arguing that "incorporating race-based discussions into the
classroom... [would create an] environment ... more likely to improve the academic
performance of students of color" and suggesting that better academic performance can be
achieved by "increased gender and racial diversity on the faculty").
33. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
34. See id. at 430 (noting that "across most of the spectrum of legal
education... blacks are heavily concentrated at the bottom of the grade distribution").
35. See Brown, supra note 3, at 27 (concluding that increased diversity on a law
school's faculty results in "better academic performance by all students").
[43:1
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particular program could be viewed as compensating for prior
years of discriminatory deprivation of educational opportunities
(this might work for special tutoring on writing skills, say, but
not easily for a commitment to diversity in new faculty hiring).
Finally, I suppose one could articulate a conceptual
connection between such initiatives and enhancing the
educational benefits of diversity; but, the connection strikes me
as very loose. If individual minority students perform better in
law school, they might develop greater self-confidence and then
be more active participants during class discussions or within
informal learning groups-and the more frequently minority
students speak, the more the values of interactive diversity will
be realized. This is, of course, an empirical question, and it is not
my experience that better performance on law school exams
generally leads to more and better classroom participation. My
sense is that the causal connection between improving individual
minority students' performance and enhancing the educational
benefits of diversity would seem too weak to satisfy the demands
of strict scrutiny.
In my view, the reason law schools should work mightily to
eradicate this pattern of comparative underachievement by
minority students is not because doing so would flow naturally
from the rationales leading a school to embrace an affirmative
action admissions program in the first place. Rather, it is because
providing low-performing students opportunities to improve their
benefit from the educational experience is clearly the right thing
to do for its own sake. Where we see students struggling-
students of any racial or other background-we should do our
best to ensure they have opportunities to get the most they can
out of law school, and are as prepared as possible for success in
the legal profession.
C. Introducing Critical Race Theory into Law Schools
So let's now turn to what I consider to be Professor Brown's
most ambitious and novel proposal, that a commitment to the
diversity rationale entails an obligation to infuse the substantive
curriculum with discourse about racial issues." In particular,
Professor Brown urges law schools to use the insight of Critical
Race Theory as a lens through which to teach substantive law
school courses throughout the entire first-year and upper division
curriculum.37
36. See id.
37. Id.
2006]
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I agree with Professor Brown's claim that a good teacher can
find racial issues, or issues that can be seen as having a different
meaning for or impact on people of different races, in virtually
every law school class.38 And I understand and appreciate the
argument that, given the deep structure and impact of race
relations on our laws and institutions and culture throughout
this nation's history, it is immensely valuable to have students
come to grips with this history and its current manifestations as
they prepare to go forth into a profession where these issues still
matter greatly. But I am less sure how or how much the adoption
of an explicit agenda for teaching such issues throughout the
curriculum would enhance the educational benefits of diversity
per se.
Professor Brown says that by "incorporat[ing] a racial
perspective of the law into all law school classes[,] .... law
schools will become more welcoming, thereby encouraging all of
our students to excel academically."39 But it isn't intuitively
obvious to me how a more welcoming environment encourages
"all" students to excel academically. Professor Brown elsewhere
suggests that students who fail to take classes dealing with racial
issues "are missing the opportunity to learn how to think
critically."" Perhaps missing "an" opportunity, but "the"
opportunity? There are many, many places in the substantive
curriculum where students are encouraged to think critically,
and it isn't clear to me what is so special about racial issues in
this regard. I'd like to hear Professor Brown's fuller explanation
of the mechanism by which the teaching of racial issues uniquely
improves the educational environment.
But my primary qualm about Professor Brown's proposal is a
different one. In Grutter, the Court makes clear that race is a
permissible factor in admissions only if other "diversity" factors
also figure prominently into admissions decisions.4 The Court
clearly wanted to know that racial considerations do not
dominate the decisionmaking process and that non-minority
candidates can also merit admission based on the ways they
diversify the class by bringing special talents, backgrounds, or
experiences to the mix.42 Michigan Law School did more than
38. Id. at 31-34.
39. Id. at 27.
40. Id. at 32.
41. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003) (deeming constitutionally
paramount Michigan Law School's "engage[ment] in a highly individualized, holistic
review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant
might contribute to a diverse educational environment").
42. Id. at 338 (concluding that Michigan Law School did "not... limit in any way
[43:1
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proclaim its commitment to a broad range of diversity factors; it
amassed data demonstrating that this is how its admissions
policy actually works on the ground.43
Why would this matter so much? Because, I believe, the
Court would have viewed an admissions program that privileged
only or mostly race as a sham, as a compensatory wolf dressed in
diversity sheep's clothing. Indeed, some critics of diversity
admissions programs continue to claim they are disguised efforts
to "pursu[e] racial representation for its own sake."'
I vehemently disagree with this characterization, and I have
a good vantage point from where I sit.45 It is true that the
Michigan Law School policy does not self-consciously purport to
enroll a "critical mass" of students with many of the other
diversity characteristics that we hold dear." But in some cases
our weighting of the factor easily generates a critical mass such
that we need not focus on the numbers in the same way. For
example, even without identifying a critical mass as an express
goal, between fifteen and twenty percent of our entering students
have at least one of the following characteristics: they have
already earned an advanced degree in some nonlaw field; they
have had real-world experience in another career path; or they
have at least one parent whose education ended short of college
(one measure of socioeconomic diversity). Plenty of students
naturally represent each of various ideological perspectives and
regional experiences. And in some cases the concept of critical
mass is inapt, because a threshold presence isn't necessary to
overcome cultural forces counseling against participation (for
example, the risk of being stereotyped as the "black" voice in the
class). Focusing more closely on the number of minority
admittees than other diversity admittees is therefore consistent
with a meaningful effort to enhance the diversity of the student
body along numerous dimensions. The Michigan Law School
the broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable
contributions to student body diversity").
43. To this day I believe that the most important data in the record from Justice
O'Connor's perspective were statistics showing how many nonminority applicants
possessing special diversity factors had "leapfrogged" over nonminority and even minority
applicants with more impressive traditional academic credentials (GPAs and LSAT
scores), proving that diversity factors other than race had a significant impact on
admission prospects. Id.
44. Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, Grutter or Otherwise: Racial
Preferences and Higher Education, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 3, 5 (2004).
45. For a detailed description of Michigan Law School's admissions policy in
operation, see generally Sarah C. Zearfoss, Admissions of a Director, 30 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 429 (2003).
46. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 44, at 4.
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policy and practice makes clear that race can, indeed, constitute
but one of many diversity factors influencing admissions
decisions, and Grutter suggests that this is necessary to sustain
the constitutionality of a race-based admissions program.47
If this is so, then it seems to me the same concern would
apply to race-based efforts to enhance educational diversity as a
second-generation issue. Now, Professor Brown's proposal is
quite interesting, among other reasons, precisely because it is
not, I believe, a race-based program of the sort that would trigger
strict scrutiny under the Grutter framework. It represents a
curricular decision that would apply to classes regardless of the
race of any faculty member or student, and it would be designed
to improve the educational experience of all students, not just
minority students. So I do not think the proposal would be
subject to serious constitutional challenge as a race-based
measure triggering strict scrutiny.
Professor Brown teasingly suggests the opposite, that
perhaps the teaching of Critical Race Theory is constitutionally
required to convince a court that a school with a race-conscious
admissions program is "walking the walk," and not just "talking
the talk," of diversity. As I said earlier, I think it is difficult to
read Grutter's approval of first-generation affirmative action as
constitutionally requiring commitment to this or any other
second-generation initiative." To begin with, Michigan Law
School's admissions program passed constitutional muster
despite the absence of this or any similar curricular reform. And
if a curricular program focusing directly on racial issues were
viewed as essential to "walking the walk" with respect to this
aspect of a diversity program, then presumably the Grutter Court
would insist that schools also adopt a curricular program
focusing on the other aspects of diversity that the Court deemed
important to ensure that the commitment to diversity was real
and not a cover for racial representation, such as infusing the
curriculum with discussions of the roles that socioeconomic
status, disabilities, interdisciplinary training, globalization, and
other diversity factors have played and still do play in the
development of the law and legal institutions.49
Because the teaching of Critical Race Theory is, in my view,
neither constitutionally prohibited nor constitutionally
47. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-38.
48. See supra Part II (doubting that post-admission diversity initiatives are
required for a law school's admission program to pass constitutional review).
49. See Grutter, 536 U.S. at 336-38 (emphasizing the importance of nonracial
diversity factors in the application process).
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compelled, the provocative question that Professor Brown puts
before us is whether teaching Critical Race Theory throughout
the curriculum would be a good idea, one that is consistent with
and furthers the laudable objectives of a race-based admissions
program designed to diversify the student body. As to this
question, I have some lingering concerns.
On one hand, I agree with Professor Brown that this
curricular reform would be a great way to ensure that all law
students have some exposure to legal issues involving race or
that affect people of different races differently. Race has played
such a central role, almost always an unfortunate one, in the
development of our law and legal institutions that it seems
ridiculous to claim that law schools can fully educate a budding
lawyer, particularly one likely to confront an increasingly diverse
array of colleagues and clients, without significant exploration of
these issues.
But on the other hand, the very boldness and visibility of
this initiative raises questions. First, employing more subtle
ways of introducing racial issues into class discussions, perhaps
providing the same examples but without the label and
theoretical superstructure, might actually do a better job of
encouraging class participation and thus generating "'cross-racial
understanding."'50 Professor Brown explains that classes taught
from a Critical Race Theory perspective will make law schools
more welcoming.5 Is this really clear, from a psychological or
sociological perspective? One can of course imagine that more
minority students will participate in class discussion where
issues concerning race are highlighted. But I can just as easily
imagine a seemingly forced discussion of race issues in some
classes making some (including some minority) students less
likely to participate. That's because some minority students
might have a greater fear of being stereotyped when they speak
during a discussion ostensibly about Critical Race Theory than
during a discussion that just happens to use examples where race
is a factor, because the salience of race in the content of the
conversation will be further heightened. I can also imagine that
non-minority students will feel less comfortable expressing
controversial ideas when the conversation is structured around
Critical Race Theory than otherwise; the self-conscious relevance
50. See Brown, supra note 3, at 28-29 (criticizing current efforts with the Critical
Race Theory superstructure for not generating enthusiastic participation from law
students).
51. Id. at 27.
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of race might make the invisible force of the "p.c. police" all the
stronger.
Indeed, when I teach Introduction to Constitutional Law, the
class and I typically generate far more rich, nuanced, and
participatory conversations about the racial implications of, say,
abortion rights or Section 5 powers than about affirmative action
directly. I suspect this is because students of all races sense that
discussing race head-on puts them at risk of being stereotyped in
various ways or being perceived as insensitive or reactionary. In
my own experience, at least, I have found that introducing
relevant racial issues into discussions in a seamless, natural way
frequently stimulates more vibrant and open conversations about
difficult topics than does introducing the topic with great public
fanfare. Perhaps much would depend on the law school
professor's skill at steering classroom conversations through
difficult terrain and creating an atmosphere of mutual trust. Not
all professors are likely to teach and lead discussions about
Critical Race Theory, or even racial issues more generally
imbedded in tax law or other doctrines, with as much skill,
knowledge, and sensitivity as I imagine Professor Brown would
do. I'll leave it to you students in the audience to draw your own
conclusions as to whether all or many professors would
successfully rise to the occasion under these circumstances.
Now, to be clear, I am raising questions about which I have
no confident answers. The only thing I am confident about is that
classroom dynamics are very complex and delicate phenomena,
and not easily predicted. At the very least, I would think we'd
want to experiment carefully with Professor Brown's proposal
and gain some empirical support for her hypothesis before
assuming it will improve rather than hurt classroom dynamics
for purposes of enhancing cross-racial conversation and
understanding. I tentatively believe that employing more subtle
ways of introducing racial issues into class discussions, perhaps
providing the same examples but without the label and
theoretical superstructure of Critical Race Theory, might actually
do a better job of encouraging class participation and thus
generating "cross-racial understanding."
Second, the exclusive focus on conversations about race as a
means to improve the educational process might itself cast
aspersions about the legitimacy of the underlying race-based
admissions policy. As explained above, the Court has insisted
that other diversity factors be considered along with race for an
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admissions program to satisfy equal protection standards.52 The
Court wants to know that the law school's expressed interest in
evaluating candidates holistically rather than mechanically is
honest, to avoid the possibility that "educational diversity" is
merely a cover-up excuse for a program designed to enhance
racial representation for unapproved reasons, such as
compensating for background societal discrimination. Some of
the other diversity factors that a school might choose to value,
such as sex and socioeconomic diversity, also historically have
played a significant role in the development of the law and legal
institutions. And one could easily imagine constructing a
curricular focus on the historical and ongoing relevance of these
other diversity factors; classes could be taught from the
perspective of feminist theory, for example, and certainly classes
could be taught highlighting the significant role wealth or
poverty have played in the construction of legal doctrines and the
allocation of legal rights and duties.
My worry is that adopting Professor Brown's proposal in
unadulterated fashion might signal that a law school, despite
giving lip service to diversity of many different backgrounds and
perspectives, is in reality concerned with diversity only regarding
race. One could, of course, just as easily imagine a law school
focusing the curriculum around gender, or sexual orientation, or
socioeconomic, or religious issues. I worry that Professor Brown's
proposal, focusing on race, would send the message, whether
intended or not, that race is the "real" type of diversity that
matters, and other forms of diversity are mere window dressing
to satisfy the Court's desire for holism. Such a message, it seems
to me, would thus have a perverse effect. Rather than
demonstrating that a school was "walking the walk" by
embracing a second-generation component to its diversity efforts,
embracing a Critical Race Theory curriculum would actually
suggest that the school's first-generation emphasis on nonracial
diversity factors was just "talking the talk," and thereby weaken
the foundation of the underlying affirmative action admissions
policy.
Professor Brown suggests in reply that law school
classrooms already do engage in conversation involving issues of
sex or class or religion, though not race.5" As such, she claims to
be advocating only that the faculty raise the level of focus on race
52. See Grutter, 536 U.S. at 336-37; see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying
text (noting that admission decisions must be based on a wide range of diversity factors, if
race is one such factor).
53. See Brown, supra note 3, at 34 & n.161.
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in the curriculum just to the level that other diversity factors are
already being engaged.54 This raises an empirical question,
though it is my personal experience (with much supporting
anecdotal evidence) that actually law school classrooms already
discuss racial issues as much if not more than issues involving
sex and class, and certainly religion. And there is a labeling
question: even if many law school courses today address nonrace
diversity factors, they do so through the pedagogic decisions of
individual faculty members rather than adoption of a school-wide
curricular program. I doubt that federal courts would ever
scrutinize the actual frequency and depth (let alone nuance) with
which classes address issues of sex, class, and religion; but courts
are likely to have their attention caught by mission statements or
express policies that focus curricular attention uniquely on racial
issues.
In the end, therefore, a unique curricular commitment to
bringing racial issues into the classroom, especially under the
bold banner of Critical Race Theory, might cast a shadow on
race-based admissions more so than forgetting entirely about
second-generation questions. Instead, a curricular commitment
to bringing racial and other diversity issues into the classroom in
subtle ways strikes me as being both legally safer and
pedagogically wiser.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Brown is to be congratulated for focusing and
indeed riveting our attention on the second-generation issues
concerning the content of legal education in a post-Grutter world.
And her particular proposal, spreading the word of Critical Race
Theory, is certainly provocative. In my view, however, the
connection between this proposal and the underlying diversity
rationale for affirmative action in admissions is such that the
very visibility of the initiative creates a vulnerability. A lower-
key effort to provide meaningful classroom opportunities for
cross-racial understanding might, in the end, be the better route.
As elsewhere in the law of affirmative action, appearances
matter.
54. See id. at 34 (proposing similar methods be used to integrate Critical Race
Theory as are used to introduce other critical perspectives into classroom discussion).
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